- See Also
- Gwern
-
Links
- “Meet the Hustlers Who Make $6,000 a Month Riding Citi Bikes”
- “Alexa Is in Millions of Households—And Amazon Is Losing Billions”, Mattioli 2024
- “Memories of an Enron Summer”, Paleologo 2024
- “A Partisan Solution to Partisan Gerrymandering: The Define-Combine Procedure”, Palmer et al 2023
- “Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Legislature”, Ali et al 2023
- “Bayesian Regression Markets”, Falconer et al 2023
- “Goodhart’s Law in Reinforcement Learning”, Karwowski et al 2023
- “Learning from Corporate Governance: First Conceptualization of a Liability for Political Decision-Making”, Follert 2023
- “The Order of Move in a Conversational War of Attrition”, Decker 2023
- “Self-Resolving Prediction Markets for Unverifiable Outcomes”, Srinivasan et al 2023
- “Trust Intermediary in a Cryptomarket for Illegal Drugs”, Andrei et al 2023
- “All-Way Stops”, Li 2023
- “Market Microstructure and Informational Efficiency: The Role of Intermediation”, Guthmann & Albrecht 2023
- “Neural Payoff Machines: Predicting Fair and Stable Payoff Allocations Among Team Members”, Cornelisse et al 2022
- “Augur: a Decentralized Oracle and Prediction Market Platform (v2.0)”, Peterson et al 2022
- “Unifying Bargaining Notions #2”, Diffractor 2022
- “Unifying Bargaining Notions #1”, Diffractor 2022
- “Human-Centered Mechanism Design With Democratic AI”, Koster et al 2022
- “Early Refund Bonuses Increase Successful Crowdfunding”, Cason et al 2021
- “The Private Mint in Economics: Evidence from the American Gold Rushes”, White 2021
- “When Hindsight Isn’t 20/20: Incentive Design With Imperfect Credit Allocation”, Wentsworth 2020
- “Skeb Artwork Commissioning Website: Review: Commission Your Favourite Japanese Artists With Auto-Translation”, Worboys 2020
- “Blockchain Enabled Carbon Credit Markets: Real Considerations to Make When Tokenizing Carbon Credits”, Greenfield 2019
- “This. Isn’t. Sparta, Part V: Spartan Government”, Devereaux 2019
- “Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design”, Kamenica 2019
- “When Matching Markets Unravel? Theory and Evidence from Federal Judicial Clerkships”, Chen et al 2019f
- “Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systems”, Hubinger et al 2019
- “The Limits of Reputation Signaling in Adversely Selected Markets: Applications to Dark Net Cocaine Markets”, Chun 2019
- “Lighthouse Provision in Premodern Japan”, Saito 2019
- “Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignment”, Hadfield-Menell & Hadfield 2018
- “The Design and Price of Information”, Bergemann et al 2018
- “Teams vs. Crowds: A Field Test of the Relative Contribution of Incentives, Member Ability, and Emergent Collaboration to Crowd-Based Problem Solving Performance”, Riedl & Woolley 2017
- “Revenue Maximization With an Uncertainty-Averse Buyer”, Chawla et al 2017
- “The Performance Pay Nobel”, Tabarrok 2016
- “Mechanism Theory”, Jackson 2014
- “A Prediction Market for Macro-Economic Variables”, Teschner et al 2011
- “A Brief History Of Paintball In Moscow”, Pelevin 2011
- “The Relationship between Quantum and Classical Correlation in Games”, Brandenburger 2010
- “Online Labor Markets”, Horton 2010
- “Telescope Time Without Tears: A Distributed Approach to Peer Review”, Merrifield & Saari 2009
- “Quantum Auctions: Facts and Myths”, Piotrowski & Sladkowski 2007
- “The Communication Requirements of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets”, Segal 2007
- “Quantum Auctions”, Hogg et al 2007
- “Communication in Economic Mechanisms”, Segal 2006b
- “Quantum and Classical Correlations between Players in Game Theory”, Shimamura et al 2003
- “Preemptive Habitat Destruction under the Endangered Species Act”, Lueck & Michael 2003
- “The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail”, Allen 2002
- “Are CEOS Rewarded for Luck? The Ones without Principals Are”, Bertrand & Mullainathan 2001
- “The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime”, Milhaupt & West 2000
- “The Contributions of the Economics of Information to 20th Century Economics”, Stiglitz 2000
- “The Provision of Incentives in Firms”, Prendergast 1999
- “Quantum Strategies”, Meyer 1998
- “Essays in Learning and the Revelation of Private Information”, Noah & Hirshleifer 1998
- “Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profiles”, Meyer 1991
- “The Bazaar Economy or How Bizarre Is the Bazaar Really?”, Fanselow 1990
- “Incentive Engineering: for Computational Resource Management”, Drexler & Miller 1988
- “Establishing Property Rights in Outer Space”, Scheraga 1987
- “Speeding, Coordination, and the 55 MPH Limit”, Lave 1985
- “The Competitive Allocation Process Is Informationally Efficient Uniquely”, Jordan 1982
- “The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing”, Geertz 1978
- “The Lighthouse in Economics”, Coase 1974b
- “The Informational Size of Message Spaces”, Mount & Reiter 1974
- “The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation”, Cheung 1973
- “A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly”, Oi 1971
- “Reward Offered for Hash Collisions for SHA-1, SHA-256, RIPEMD-160 and Other”, Todd 2024
- “On Stake”
- “Proof of Stake FAQs”
- “From Kyoto Protocol to Klima Protocol (🌳,🌳)”
- “The Unexpected Origins of a Modern Finance Tool”
- “‘On Radical Markets’, Vitalik Buterin”
- “Liability Regimes for AI”
- “The Business of Kidnapping: inside the Secret World of Hostage Negotiation”
- “In the Sublet Economy, You Can Turn Anything into Extra Cash: Your House, Your Car, Your Boat, or Your Backyard.”
- Wikipedia
- Miscellaneous
- Bibliography
See Also
Gwern
“Miscellaneous”, Gwern 2009
“Startup Ideas”, Gwern 2017
“CO2 Coin: Decentralized Carbon Capture Blockchains”, Gwern 2021
“How OVAs Worked”, Gwern 2023
“Silk Road 1: Theory & Practice”, Gwern 2011
Links
“Meet the Hustlers Who Make $6,000 a Month Riding Citi Bikes”
“Alexa Is in Millions of Households—And Amazon Is Losing Billions”, Mattioli 2024
Alexa Is in Millions of Households—and Amazon Is Losing Billions
“Memories of an Enron Summer”, Paleologo 2024
“A Partisan Solution to Partisan Gerrymandering: The Define-Combine Procedure”, Palmer et al 2023
A Partisan Solution to Partisan Gerrymandering: The Define-Combine Procedure
“Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Legislature”, Ali et al 2023
“Bayesian Regression Markets”, Falconer et al 2023
“Goodhart’s Law in Reinforcement Learning”, Karwowski et al 2023
“Learning from Corporate Governance: First Conceptualization of a Liability for Political Decision-Making”, Follert 2023
“The Order of Move in a Conversational War of Attrition”, Decker 2023
“Self-Resolving Prediction Markets for Unverifiable Outcomes”, Srinivasan et al 2023
“Trust Intermediary in a Cryptomarket for Illegal Drugs”, Andrei et al 2023
“All-Way Stops”, Li 2023
“Market Microstructure and Informational Efficiency: The Role of Intermediation”, Guthmann & Albrecht 2023
Market Microstructure and Informational Efficiency: The Role of Intermediation
“Neural Payoff Machines: Predicting Fair and Stable Payoff Allocations Among Team Members”, Cornelisse et al 2022
Neural Payoff Machines: Predicting Fair and Stable Payoff Allocations Among Team Members
“Augur: a Decentralized Oracle and Prediction Market Platform (v2.0)”, Peterson et al 2022
Augur: a Decentralized Oracle and Prediction Market Platform (v2.0)
“Unifying Bargaining Notions #2”, Diffractor 2022
“Unifying Bargaining Notions #1”, Diffractor 2022
“Human-Centered Mechanism Design With Democratic AI”, Koster et al 2022
“Early Refund Bonuses Increase Successful Crowdfunding”, Cason et al 2021
“The Private Mint in Economics: Evidence from the American Gold Rushes”, White 2021
The private mint in economics: evidence from the American gold rushes
“When Hindsight Isn’t 20/20: Incentive Design With Imperfect Credit Allocation”, Wentsworth 2020
When Hindsight Isn’t 20/20: Incentive Design With Imperfect Credit Allocation
“Skeb Artwork Commissioning Website: Review: Commission Your Favourite Japanese Artists With Auto-Translation”, Worboys 2020
“Blockchain Enabled Carbon Credit Markets: Real Considerations to Make When Tokenizing Carbon Credits”, Greenfield 2019
Blockchain Enabled Carbon Credit Markets: Real considerations to make when tokenizing carbon credits:
“This. Isn’t. Sparta, Part V: Spartan Government”, Devereaux 2019
“Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design”, Kamenica 2019
“When Matching Markets Unravel? Theory and Evidence from Federal Judicial Clerkships”, Chen et al 2019f
When Matching Markets Unravel? Theory and Evidence from Federal Judicial Clerkships
“Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systems”, Hubinger et al 2019
Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systems
“The Limits of Reputation Signaling in Adversely Selected Markets: Applications to Dark Net Cocaine Markets”, Chun 2019
“Lighthouse Provision in Premodern Japan”, Saito 2019
“Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignment”, Hadfield-Menell & Hadfield 2018
“The Design and Price of Information”, Bergemann et al 2018
“Teams vs. Crowds: A Field Test of the Relative Contribution of Incentives, Member Ability, and Emergent Collaboration to Crowd-Based Problem Solving Performance”, Riedl & Woolley 2017
“Revenue Maximization With an Uncertainty-Averse Buyer”, Chawla et al 2017
“The Performance Pay Nobel”, Tabarrok 2016
“Mechanism Theory”, Jackson 2014
“A Prediction Market for Macro-Economic Variables”, Teschner et al 2011
“A Brief History Of Paintball In Moscow”, Pelevin 2011
“The Relationship between Quantum and Classical Correlation in Games”, Brandenburger 2010
The relationship between quantum and classical correlation in games
“Online Labor Markets”, Horton 2010
“Telescope Time Without Tears: A Distributed Approach to Peer Review”, Merrifield & Saari 2009
Telescope Time Without Tears: A Distributed Approach to Peer Review
“Quantum Auctions: Facts and Myths”, Piotrowski & Sladkowski 2007
“The Communication Requirements of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets”, Segal 2007
The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
“Quantum Auctions”, Hogg et al 2007
“Communication in Economic Mechanisms”, Segal 2006b
“Quantum and Classical Correlations between Players in Game Theory”, Shimamura et al 2003
Quantum and classical correlations between players in game theory
“Preemptive Habitat Destruction under the Endangered Species Act”, Lueck & Michael 2003
Preemptive Habitat Destruction under the Endangered Species Act
“The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail”, Allen 2002
The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail
“Are CEOS Rewarded for Luck? The Ones without Principals Are”, Bertrand & Mullainathan 2001
“The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime”, Milhaupt & West 2000
The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime
“The Contributions of the Economics of Information to 20th Century Economics”, Stiglitz 2000
The Contributions of the Economics of Information to 20th Century Economics
“The Provision of Incentives in Firms”, Prendergast 1999
“Quantum Strategies”, Meyer 1998
“Essays in Learning and the Revelation of Private Information”, Noah & Hirshleifer 1998
Essays in learning and the revelation of private information
“Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profiles”, Meyer 1991
Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profiles
“The Bazaar Economy or How Bizarre Is the Bazaar Really?”, Fanselow 1990
“Incentive Engineering: for Computational Resource Management”, Drexler & Miller 1988
Incentive Engineering: for Computational Resource Management
“Establishing Property Rights in Outer Space”, Scheraga 1987
“Speeding, Coordination, and the 55 MPH Limit”, Lave 1985
“The Competitive Allocation Process Is Informationally Efficient Uniquely”, Jordan 1982
The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely
“The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing”, Geertz 1978
The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing:
“The Lighthouse in Economics”, Coase 1974b
“The Informational Size of Message Spaces”, Mount & Reiter 1974
“The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation”, Cheung 1973
“A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly”, Oi 1971
A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly:
“Reward Offered for Hash Collisions for SHA-1, SHA-256, RIPEMD-160 and Other”, Todd 2024
Reward offered for hash collisions for SHA-1, SHA-256, RIPEMD-160 and other
“On Stake”
On Stake:
“Proof of Stake FAQs”
“From Kyoto Protocol to Klima Protocol (🌳,🌳)”
“The Unexpected Origins of a Modern Finance Tool”
“‘On Radical Markets’, Vitalik Buterin”
“Liability Regimes for AI”
“The Business of Kidnapping: inside the Secret World of Hostage Negotiation”
The business of kidnapping: inside the secret world of hostage negotiation
“In the Sublet Economy, You Can Turn Anything into Extra Cash: Your House, Your Car, Your Boat, or Your Backyard.”
Wikipedia
Miscellaneous
-
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3693705/Kremer_PatentBuyouts.pdf?sequence=2#page=2: -
https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/HFBJMyCiuPyshRvWq/impact-certificates-on-a-blockchain: -
https://libgen.li/book/index.php?md5=131C917701ED2B3A571305F2B2CC37F7:View External Link:
https://libgen.li/book/index.php?md5=131C917701ED2B3A571305F2B2CC37F7 -
https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/retroactive-public-goods-funding-33c9b7d00f0c -
https://priceonomics.com/the-spectrum-auction-how-economists-saved-the-day/ -
https://slate.com/culture/2001/02/the-first-one-now-will-later-be-last.html -
https://theoryclass.wordpress.com/2013/06/06/a-mechanism-design-approach-to-peer-review/: -
https://truthonthemarket.com/2023/05/23/how-much-information-do-markets-require/ -
https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2021/11/16/retro1.html#should-badge-holder-votes-be-secret-ballot -
https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2023/08/16/communitynotes.html -
https://web.cecs.pdx.edu/~cvwright/papers/crumplezones.pdf: -
https://worksinprogress.co/issue/why-prediction-markets-arent-popular/: -
https://www.anthropic.com/news/the-long-term-benefit-trust: -
https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/impact-markets-the-annoying-details -
https://www.filfre.net/2023/09/magic-and-loss-part-1-magic-in-the-cards/ -
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/CwgHX9tbfASqxjpsc/the-economics-of-the-asteroid-deflection-problem: -
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Eu6CvP7c7ivcGM3PJ/goodhart-s-law-in-reinforcement-learning: -
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/QG2ZQm2Fxq8ET22sT/strategyproof-mechanisms-possibilities: -
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/dzjQLJA4GamTyny6f/update-to-dominant-assurance-contract-platform: -
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/wE3CRBTpSSBXf9EHK/strategyproof-mechanisms-impossibilities: -
https://www.lesswrong.com/tag/mechanism-design:View External Link:
-
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2007/popular-information/ -
https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/advanced-economicsciences2007.pdf: -
https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/maskin_lecture.pdf: -
https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/myerson_lecture.pdf: -
https://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/biggestpaper.pdf#page=2: -
https://www.overcomingbias.com/p/office-by-combo-auctionhtml -
https://www.quantamagazine.org/mark-braverman-wins-the-imu-abacus-medal-20220705/ -
https://www2.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2021/EECS-2021-207.pdf#page=3:
Bibliography
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https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-analysis/article/partisan-solution-to-partisan-gerrymandering-the-definecombine-procedure/B0792DD0A49332944F2AF5FF6828E275: “A Partisan Solution to Partisan Gerrymandering: The Define-Combine Procedure”, -
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176523002069: “The Order of Move in a Conversational War of Attrition”, -
2022-peterson.pdf: “Augur: a Decentralized Oracle and Prediction Market Platform (v2.0)”, -
https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2016/10/performance-pay-nobel.html: “The Performance Pay Nobel”, -
2011-pelevin.pdf: “A Brief History Of Paintball In Moscow”, -
2010-brandenburger.pdf: “The Relationship between Quantum and Classical Correlation in Games”, -
2002-allen.pdf: “The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail”, -
https://papers.agoric.com/papers/incentive-engineering-for-computational-resource-management/full-text/: “Incentive Engineering: for Computational Resource Management”, -
1985-lave.pdf: “Speeding, Coordination, and the 55 MPH Limit”, -
1973-cheung.pdf: “The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation”,